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Abstract. Case-based reasoning (CBR) is extensively used in AI in support of sev-
eral applications, to assess a new situation (or case) by recollecting past situations
(or cases) and employing the ones most similar to the new situation to give the
assessment. In this paper we study properties of a recently proposed method for
CBR, based on instantiated Abstract Argumentation and referred to as AA-CBR,
for problems where cases are represented by abstract factors and (positive or neg-
ative) outcomes, and an outcome for a new case, represented by abstract factors,
needs to be established. In addition, we study properties of explanations in AA-
CBR and deﬁne a new notion of lean explanations that utilize solely relevant cases.
Both forms of explanations can be seen as dialogical processes between a propo-
nent and an opponent, with the burden of proof falling on the proponent.
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1. Introduction
Case-based reasoning (CBR), as overviewed in [28], is extensively used in various ap-
plications of AI (see e.g. [23,28]). At a high-level, in CBR a reasoner in need to assess a
new situation, or new case, recollects past situations, or past cases, and employs the ones
most similar to the new situation to give the assessment. Several approaches to CBR use
(forms of) argumentation, e.g. [1,27] and, more recently, the AA-CBR approch of [11].
AA-CBR instantiates Abstract Argumentation (AA) [12] to resolve conﬂicts
amongst most similar past cases with diverging outcomes. It provides: 1) a method for
computing outcomes for new cases, given past cases and a default outcome; and 2) expla-
nations for computed outcomes, as dialogical exchanges between a proponent, in favour
of the default outcome for the new case, and an opponent, against the default outcome.
As common in the literature (see e.g. [5,25,28]), in AA-CBR past cases are repre-
sented as sets of factors (also known as features or attribute-value pairs, cf. [30]) together
with an outcome, which may be positive (+) or negative (−). AA-CBR then relies upon
the grounded extension [12] of an AA framework with, as arguments, a default case (with
an empty set of factors and the default outcome), past cases (with their outcomes) and a
new case (with unknown outcome). A past case attacks another past case or the default
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case if they have a different outcomes, the former is more speciﬁc than the latter and at
least as concise as any other similarly more speciﬁc, conﬂicting past case. The following
example, used or adapted throughout the paper, illustrates AA-CBR.
Example 1. Suppose Bob wishes to rent his spare room to get between £800 and £900
per month, and decides to use an online AA-CBR system to determine whether this
amount is reasonable and why, based on similar lodgings being rented. Let N, the new
case, represent the set of features of Bob’s room, e.g. N = {S,E,O,G} (the room is
Small, with an En-suite bathroom in an Open-plan ﬂat with a Gym in the building). Here
the default outcome is +, indicating Bob’s bias for the price range £800–£900. The past
cases are either of the form (X ,+), for lodgings in the desired price range, or (Y,−), for
lodgings in different (lower or higher) price ranges, with X , Y the feature sets of these
lodgings. For example, suppose the past cases are ({S},−) (Small rooms go for lower
prices), ({S,E},+) (En-suite compensates for Small room), ({S,O},+) (Open-plan ﬂat
compensates for Small). Then, the corresponding (instantiated) AA framework [11] is
depicted below (with attacks represented by arrows, ( /0,+) the argument for the default
case, and ({S,E,O,G},?) the argument for the new case):
( /0,+) ({S},−)
({S,E},+)
({S,O},+)
({S,E,O,G},?)
G = {({S,E,O,G},?), ({S,E,},+), ({S,O,},+), ( /0,+)} is the grounded extension of
this AA framework. Since ( /0,+) ∈G, the outcome for the new case determined by AA-
CBR is +, with two possible explanations TP and T ′P depicted below (with P standing
for proponent and O standing for opponent):
TP [P :( /0,+)]
[O :({S},−)]
[P :({S,E},+)]
T ′P [P :( /0,+)]
[O :({S},−)]
[P :({S,O},+)]
Thus, for example, TP explains the recommendation + dialectically as follows: the de-
fault outcome + needs to be defended against the objection posed by past case ({S},−),
and this can be achieved by using past case ({S,E},+), that cannot be objected against.
In this paper we propose a novel form of explanations, called lean explanations, and
study properties of both forms of explanations in AA-CBR. Explanations can naturally
be seen as dialogical exchanges between a proponent and an opponent, the former having
the burden of proof for explaining as well as establishing the outcome of the new case.
The paper is organized as follows. We ﬁrst recall, in Section 2, the necessary back-
ground. In Section 3 we prove some properties of AA-CBR, in the context of some re-
lated work, and in Section 4 we investigate properties of explanations in AA-CBR. We
then allot Section 5 to relate AA-CBR with proof standards and burden of proof. We
conclude with a discussion on related and future work in Section 6.
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2. Background
AA-CBR [11] assumes a ﬁxed but otherwise arbitrary (possibly inﬁnite) set F of factors,
and a set {+,−} of outcomes, one of which is singled out as the default outcome d. The
complement of d is indicated as d, and is: + if d = −; and − if d = +. A case is a pair
(X ,o) with X ⊆ F and o ∈ {+,−}; a case base is a ﬁnite set CB ⊆℘(F)×{+,−} such
that for (X ,oX ),(Y,oY ) ∈ CB, if X = Y , then oX = oY ; a new case is a set N ⊆ F.
AA-CBR maps the problem of determining the outcome for a new case into a mem-
bership problem within the grounded extension of an AA framework [12] obtained from
the case base CB, the new case N and the default outcome d. In general, following [12],
an AA framework is a pair (Args,), where Args is a set (of arguments) and  is a
binary relation on Args (where, for a,b ∈ Args, if a b, then we say that a attacks b).
For a set of arguments E ⊆ Args and an argument a ∈ Args, E defends a if for all b a
there exists c ∈ E such that c b. Then, the grounded extension of (Args,) can be
constructed as G=
⋃
i0 Gi, where G0 is the set of all unattacked arguments, and ∀i 0,
Gi+1 is the set of arguments that Gi defends. For any (Args,), the grounded extension
G always exists and is unique, and, if (Args,) is well-founded [12], extensions under
other semantics are equal to G. AA-CBR uses the following instance of AA [11]:
Deﬁnition 2. The AA framework corresponding to a case base CB, a default outcome
d ∈ {+,−} and a new case N is (Args,) satisfying the following conditions:
• Args = CB∪{( /0,d)}∪{(N,?)};
• for (X ,oX ),(Y,oY ) ∈ CB∪{( /0,d)}, it holds that (X ,oX ) (Y,oY ) iff
∗ oX = oY , and (different outcomes)
∗ Y  X , and (speciﬁcity)
∗ (Z,oX ) ∈ CB with Y  Z  X ; (concision)
• for (Y,oY ) ∈ CB, (N,?) (Y,oY ) holds iff Y  N.
(N,?) is referred to as the new case argument and ( /0,d) as the default case.
In what follows, (Args,) is the AA framework corresponding to a given, generic
CB, d and N, and G is its grounded extension. Note the following: (Args,) is ﬁnite
(as case bases are); G = /0 (as (N,?) is unattacked); (Args,) is well-founded (due to
the speciﬁcity requirement in Deﬁnition 2), so that G is a unique extension under other
semantics. AA-CBR decides the outcome for the new case as follows [11]:
Deﬁnition 3. The AA outcome of the new case N is:
• the default outcome d, if ( /0,d) ∈G; • d, otherwise, if ( /0,d) ∈G.
In AA-CBR, explanations for AA outcomes are deﬁned in terms of dispute trees
[11,13,14], where a dispute tree for a ∈ Args is a tree T such that:
1. every node of T is of the form [L:x], with L∈ {P,O}, x∈Args: the node is labelled
by argument x and assigned the status of either proponent (P) or opponent (O);
2. the root of T is a P node labelled by a;
3. for every P node n, labelled by some b ∈ Args, and for every c ∈ Args such that
c b, there exists a child of n, which is an O node labelled by c;
4. for every O node n, labelled by some b ∈ Args, there exists at most one child of n
which is a P node labelled by some c ∈ Args such that c b;
5. there are no other nodes in T except those given by 1–4.
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The defence set of T , denoted by D(T ), is the set of all arguments labelling P
nodes in T . A dispute tree T is an admissible dispute tree iff (i) every O node in T
has a child, and (ii) no argument in T labels both P and O nodes. A dispute tree T is a
maximal dispute tree [11] iff for all opponent nodes [O :x] which are leaves in T there is
no y∈ Args such that y x. Note that an admissible dispute tree T for some a∈ Args is
also a maximal dispute tree for a∈ Args [11, Lemma 4]. Indeed, in an admissible dispute
tree, each O node has exactly one child (a P node); thus, no O node is a leaf, and so the
dispute tree is maximal.
Explanations in AA-CBR are deﬁned as follows [11]:
Deﬁnition 4. If the AA outcome of N is d, then an explanation for why the AA outcome
of N is d is any admissible dispute tree for ( /0,d). If the AA outcome of N is d, then an
explanation for why the AA outcome of N is d is any maximal dispute tree for ( /0,d).
Example 1 illustrates the notion of explanation for why the outcome is d. The fol-
lowing example illustrates the notion of explanation for why the outcome is d.
Example 5 (Example 1 ctd.). Suppose there is an additional case ({S,E,O},−) in CB.
Then the corresponding AA framework is depicted below:
( /0,+) ({S},−)
({S,E},+)
({S,O},+)
({S,E,O},−) ({S,E,O,G},?)
Here,G= {({S,E,O,G},?), ({S,E,O},−), ({S},−)}, so the AA outcome of {S,E,O,G}
is −, for which the dispute trees (in linear notation) TO : [P : ({ /0},+)] — [O : ({S},−)]
— [P : ({S,E},+)] — [O : ({S,E,O},−)] and T ′O : [P : ({ /0},+]) — [O : ({S},−)] —
[P :({S,O},+)] — [O :({S,E,O},−)] are explanations.
3. Properties of AA outcomes
In this section, we prove several properties of AA outcomes, focusing on aspects that
have been considered in some related work on CBR. Where indicated, these properties
were stated in [11] already, but their proofs omitted there.
In the context of, particularly, legal CBR, as well as CBR in general, two properties
are identiﬁed as important [3], namely that cases employed in determining the outcome
of a new case N should be most on point and untrumped, where (X ,o) is:
most on point iff no other case with the same outcome shares a more inclusive set of
factors with the new case, i.e. X ∩N is ⊆-maximal for X ′ ∩N with (X ′,o) ∈ CB;
untrumped iff no counterexample is more on point, i.e. there is no (Y,oY ) ∈ CB satis-
fying both oY = o and X ∩N  Y ∩N.
These two constraints together can be summarized into a single condition of X ∩N being
⊆-maximal among allY ∩N with (Y,o′)∈CB. These properties—of being most on point
and untrumped—allow for ‘deviating’ factors (i.e. factors not present in N) amongst past
cases to be used to determine the outcome of the new case, whereas AA outcome does
not. For an illustration, consider the following modiﬁcation of our running example.
K. ˇCyras et al. / Explanation for Case-Based Reasoning via Abstract Argumentation246
Example 6. Suppose there is an additional past case ({S,E,O,M},+) in Example 5: a
Motorway next to the building is disadvantageous and the price of a Small En-suite room
in an Open plan ﬂat next to a Motorway falls into Bob’s price range:
( /0,+) ({S},−)
({S,E},+)
({S,O},+)
({S,E,O},−)
({S,E,O,M},+)
({S,E,O,G},?)
Here, both ({S,E,O},−) and ({S,E,O,M},+) are most on point and untrumped, yet
({S,E,O,M},+) is attacked by the new case and so effectively discarded from inﬂuenc-
ing the AA outcome, which is −, as in Example 5.
The notion of AA outcome fulﬁls a variant of the properties of being most on
point and untrumped, that disregards ‘deviating’ factors and focuses instead on nearest
cases [11], where (X ,oX ) is
nearest to N iff X ⊆ N, and (Y,oY ) ∈ CB with Y ⊆ N and X  Y .
In other words, (X ,oX ) is nearest to N iff X ⊆ N is ⊆-maximal in the case base. In
Example 6, ({S,E,O},−) is nearest, but ({S,E,O,M},+) is not, because M ∈ N.
Like elsewhere in the literature, e.g. [22,23,28], in AA-CBR nearest cases are very
important. In particular, when CB contains a single nearest case (X ,o) to N, the AA
outcome of N is fully determined by (X ,o), independently of what d is, as follows:
Proposition 1 ([11, Proposition 2]). If there is a unique nearest case (X ,o) to N, then,
for any d ∈ {+,−}, the AA outcome of N is o.
Proof. Let (X ,o) ∈ CB be the unique nearest case to N. Consider a chain of attacks
(Y,oY ) . . . ( /0,d), with n 1 arguments and (Y,oY ) unattacked in (Args,). First,
we know that (Y,oY ) ∈G. Assuming oY = o, we ﬁnd Y  X (as (X ,o) is unique nearest
to N), whence (X ,o) (Y,oY ) gives a contradiction. So oY = o. Thus, if o = d, then n
is odd, and so G defends ( /0,d), so that ( /0,d) ∈G. Else, if o = d, then n is even, so that
G attacks ( /0,d), and so ( /0,d) ∈G. In any case, the AA outcome of N is o.
In Example 6, the AA outcome of {S,E,O,G} is −, the outcome of the unique
nearest case ({S,E,O},−) (and the complement of the default outcome+). If instead the
default outcome was −, the structure of the AA framework would change (in particular,
the attack relation would be different), but the AA outcome would remain unchanged.
In AA-CBR, nearest cases are important as they belong to the grounded extension:
Proposition 2 ([11, Lemma 1]). G contains all the nearest past cases to N.
Proof. Let (X ,oX ) ∈ CB be nearest to N. Then X ⊆ N, so (N,?)  (X ,oX ). Now assume
that (Y,oY ) (X ,oX ), for some (Y,oY ) ∈ CB. Then Y  N, whence (N,?) (Y,oY ).
Since the new case argument (N,?) is unattacked in (Args,), we have (N,?) ∈ G. As
(Y,oY ) was arbitrary, we know that G defends (X ,oX ), so that (X ,oX ) ∈G.
This result shows that AA-CBR takes into account all the most similar past cases
when determining the outcome of a new case. This is in contrast with some forms of the
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conventional k-nearest neighbour approaches to CBR, where some of the nearest cases
may be ignored in order to decide the new case [28] (see also Section 6 for a discussion).
Note that G contains not only the nearest cases (as well as the new case N), but also
some other past cases: in Examples 5, 6, G includes ({S},−), which is not nearest to N,
but still ‘relevant’ to the AA outcome. Overall, past cases, as arguments, can be classiﬁed
into those deemed relevant and irrelevant for deciding the new case, as follows:
Deﬁnition 7. An argument (X ,o) ∈ Args\{( /0,d)} is said to be:
• relevant if X ∩N = /0;
• irrelevant otherwise, if X ∩N = /0.
By convention, the default case ( /0,d) is also deemed relevant.
Since arguments in AA-CBR are cases, with an abuse of notation we sometimes talk
about cases being relevant and irrelevant.
In Example 6, all cases (including the default case) are relevant. If there was, say, a
case ({H},−) in CB, it would be irrelevant, as {H}∩{S,E,O,G}= /0.
The relevance criteria deﬁned above will play a role in characterizing explanations
of AA outcomes, which we will investigate in the next section.
4. Explanations of AA Outcomes
The notion of AA outcome allows to determine algorithmically whether a new case N
should be assigned the default outcome (d) or not (d), by determining whether the default
case ( /0,d) belongs or not (respectively) to the grounded extension G of the AA frame-
work (Args,) corresponding to the given case base CB, d and N. Explanations of AA
outcomes (Section 2) exploit the argumentative re-interpretation afforded by AA-CBR
utilizing not only the nearest cases, but also dialectical exchanges of relevant arguments
(cf. e.g. [26]). In this section, we prove several properties of explanations in AA-CBR.
Where indicated, these properties were stated in [11], but their proofs omitted there.
The following result will help us to characterize explanations of AA outcomes.
Theorem 3. ( /0,d) ∈G iff there exists an admissible dispute tree T for ( /0,d).
Proof. By Theorem 3.2 in [14], there is an admissible dispute tree T for ( /0,d) iff ( /0,d) is
in some admissible extension. Every admissible extension is contained in some preferred
extension [12] and, as (Args,) is well founded,G is the only preferred extension. Thus,
( /0,d) is in some admissible extension iff ( /0,d) ∈G, and so the claim follows.
Thus, an explanation for the default outcome always exists:
Proposition 4 ([11, Proposition 3]). If the AA outcome of the new case N is the default
outcome d, then there is an explanation T for why the AA outcome of N is d, which is
moreover such that the defence set D(T ) is admissible and D(T )⊆G.
Proof. Existence of explanations follows from Theorem 3. Further, Theorem 3.2, part
(ii), in [14], says that if a ∈ Args belongs to an admissible set A ⊆ Args of arguments,
then there exists an admissible dispute tree T for a such that D(T ) ⊆ A and D(T ) is
admissible. Since G is admissible and ( /0,d) ∈ G, there is an admissible dispute tree T
for ( /0,d) with D(T ) admissible and D(T )⊆G.
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An analogous result holds regarding explanations for the non-default outcome:
Proposition 5 ([11, Proposition 5]). If the AA outcome of the new case N is d, then there
is an explanation T for why the AA outcome of N is d, and moreover D(T )G.
Proof. Theorem 3.1 in [14] states that a dispute tree T such that every O node in T
has a child, is necessarily admissible if it is ﬁnite. Since dispute trees in our setting are
guaranteed to be ﬁnite, any dispute tree with all leaves labelled P would be admissible,
yielding ( /0,d) ∈ G (by Theorem 3), contradicting the AA outcome of N being d. Thus,
some dispute tree T for ( /0,d) will have all O unattacked in (Args,), and so be maxi-
mal, as required. Further, if D(T )⊆G then, by deﬁnition of dispute trees and grounded
extensions, ( /0,d) ∈G, which is again a contradiction. Hence, D(T )G.
In Example 1, dispute trees TP : [P : ( /0,+)] — [O : ({S},−)] — [P : ({S,E},+)] and
T ′P : [P : ( /0,+)] — [O : ({S},−)] — [P : ({S,O},+)] are explanations for why the AA
outcome of {S,E,O,G} is +, with D(TP) = {({S,E},+),( /0,+)} ⊆ G and D(T ′P ) =
{({S,O},+),( /0,+)} ⊆ G, both admissible. Each explanation serves Bob to legitimize
why he is justiﬁed in asking the price he has in mind. Similarly, in Example 5 (where
CB from Example 1 is augmented with ({S,E,O},−)), the trees TO : [P : ( /0,+)] — [O :
({S},−)] — [P : ({S,E},+)] — [O : ({S,E,O},−)] and T ′O : [P : ( /0,+)] — [O : ({S},−)]
— [P : ({S,O},+)] — [O : ({S,E,O},−)] are explanations for why the AA outcome of
{S,E,O,G} is −, with the same defence sets as TP and T ′P (respectively), yet no longer
contained in G. Each explanation indicates that Bob should reconsider his price tag.
The next result says that every case that should be considered in explaining as well
as determining the AA outcome is indeed considered.
Proposition 6. For every nearest case (X ,o), there is an explanation T (for why the AA
outcome of N is either d or d) s.t. for some (X ′,o) with X ′ ⊆ X we ﬁnd (X ′,o) ∈ D(T ).
Proof. If a nearest case (X ,o) does not itself appear in any explanation, then some (X ′,o)
with X ′ ⊆ X must appear in some explanation T . In any event, if either o = d or o = d,
we ﬁnd (X ′,o) ∈ D(T ) by construction of G and T .
In Example 5, the unique nearest case ({S,E,O},−) to N = {S,E,O,G} labels
a node in both explanations TO and T ′O (as above) for why the AA outcome of N
is −. Observe that ({S,E,O},−) is unattacked. This need not always happen: in Ex-
ample 6, ({S,E,O},−) is still a unique nearest case to N, but this time attacked by
({S,E,O,M},+), which is in turn attacked by (N,?). In any event, ({S,E,O},−) la-
bels a node in both possible explanations, namely T1 : [P : ( /0,+)] — [O : ({S},−)] —
[P : ({S,E},+)] — [O : ({S,E,O},−)] — [P : ({S,E,O,M},+)] — [O : ({S,E,O,G},?)]
and T2 : [P : ( /0,+]) — [O : ({S},−)] — [P : ({S,O},+)] — [O : ({S,E,O},−)] —
[P :({S,E,O,M},+)] — [O :({S,E,O,G},?)], for why the AA outcome of N is −.
A nearest case need not itself appear in any explanation; instead, some of its ‘proper
subsets’ will. For instance, suppose that in Example 5, instead of ({S,E,O},−), we have
({S,E,O},+), which is then a unique nearest case to N. The AA outcome of N is then +,
for which TP : [P : ( /0,+)] — [O : ({S},−)] — [P : ({S,E},+)] and T ′P : [P : ( /0,+)] — [O :
({S},−)] — [P : ({S,O},+)] are explanations, with D(TP) = {({S,E},+),( /0,+)} and
D(T ′P ) = {({S,O},+),( /0,+)}. Thus, ({S,E,O},+) does not label any node in either
TP or T ′P , but ({S,E},+) and ({S,O},+) do.
In general, every argument in an explanation has a reason to appear there:
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Proposition 7. Every argument labelling a node in an explanation T (for why the AA
outcome of N is either d or d), is either relevant or attacked by (N,?).
Proof. By deﬁnition of relevance, if (X ,o) = ( /0,d) labels a node in T and is irrelevant,
then X ∩N = /0, so that (N,?) (X ,o), by deﬁnition of attack.
In Example 5, every argument labelling a node in any of the explanations TO and T ′O
is relevant. To see that irrelevant arguments can also appear in explanations, consider a
single past case ({A},+), default outcome − and a new case {B}. In the corresponding
(Args,), we ﬁnd ({B},?) ({A},+) ( /0,−) and G= {({B},?),( /0,−)}, so that the
AA outcome of {B} is −, for which T : [P : ( /0,−)] — [O : ({A},+)] — [P : ({B},?)] is
an explanation. Here, ({A},+) is irrelevant. Observe further that there could be many
more similar irrelevant cases ({A1},+), ({A2},+), . . . , whence there would be as many
explanations, all of them containing an irrelevant case.
To avoid overpopulation of explanations with irrelevant arguments, we next propose
a leaner version of explanations that contain only relevant arguments.
Deﬁnition 8. Let a relevant dispute tree be a dispute tree in construction of which only
relevant arguments can label nodes. A lean explanation for why the AA outcome of N
is d (resp., d) is an admissible (resp., maximal) relevant dispute tree for ( /0,d).
As for (standard) explanations, the defence set of a lean explanation T L, denoted
by D(T L), is the set of all arguments labelling P nodes in T L.
The explanations discussed in Examples 1, 5 and 6 are lean, whereas the explana-
tions discussed in the example before Deﬁnition 8 are not: the only lean explanation there
is simply T L : [P :( /0,−)].
Note that a lean explanation for why the AA outcome of N is d (resp., d) is a maximal
subtree of an explanation for why the AA outcome of N is d (resp., d) such that no parent
node is labelled by an irrelevant argument. Plainly, lean explanations can be obtained
from (standard) explanations by removing irrelevant nodes, as well as their children.
From Proposition 7 and Deﬁnition 8 it trivially follows that nothing is irrelevant in
lean explanations:
Corollary 8. Every argument labelling a node in a lean explanation T L (for why the
AA outcome of N is either d or d) is relevant.
Simultaneously, lean explanations keep desirable properties in the following sense.
Corollary 9. If the AA outcome of N is d, then there is a lean explanation T L for why
the AA outcome of N is d, such that D(T L)∪{(N,?)} is admissible and D(T L)⊆G.
If the AA outcome of N is d, then there is a lean explanation T L for why the AA
outcome of N is d, such that D(T L)G.
Proof. Follows from Propositions 4 and 5, in the ﬁrst instance noticing that (N,?) need
not have a relevant parent in an explanation (and hence (N,?) ∈ D(T L)).
Utilizing the following deﬁnition, we see that lean explanations also impose a certain
structure to the otherwise unstructured collection of relevant cases.
Deﬁnition 9. Let (X ,oX ),(Y,oY ) ∈ Args be relevant. We say that (X ,oX ) is more rele-
vant than (Y,oY ) if either Y  X or (X ,oX ) = (N,?).
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Proposition 10. Every argument labelling a node in a lean explanation (for why the AA
outcome of N is either d or d) is more relevant than the argument labelling its parent.
Proof. Follows from Deﬁnitions 2 (attack), 8 (lean explanations) and 9.
Apart from structuring past cases and providing dialogical justiﬁcations for why a
particular outcome is assigned to a new case, explanations also yield hints on modifying
the situation so as to achieve the desired outcome. For example, imagine that Alice wants
to let a Small room with En-suite (N = {S,E}) for over £ 900, and past cases are ({E},−)
(En-suite falls short) and ({S,E,H},+) (High-speed internet brings the rent over £ 900).
The AA outcome of N is − (as ({E},−) is a unique nearest case to N), with an expla-
nation [P : ( /0,+)] — [O : ({E},−)] — [P : ({S,E,H},+)] — [O : ({S,E},?)], from which
Alice sees that installing High-speed internet would allow her to ask the price she wants.
This last illustration, together with the previously considered examples, hint at a
feature of AA-CBR, namely that AA outcomes and (lean) explanations exhibit a certain
asymmetry between the proponent and the opponent. This is in line with the asymmetry
observed in the context of CBR, e.g. in [26].
5. Proof Standards for AA Outcome
In this section we show that the asymmetry described above is a manifestation of the bur-
den of proof [18] falling onto the proponent, by introducing, for AA-CBR frameworks,
a variant of a well-known proof standard. Consider the following example.
Example 10. Let N = {A,B,C} and CB = {({A},+), ({B},−)}. Consider the two de-
fault outcomes − and + in turn. Below are depicted the AA frameworks (Args,)d
corresponding to CB, d ∈ {−,+} and N:
(Args,)−
( /0,−)
({A},+)
({B},−)
({A,B,C},?)
(Args,)+
( /0,+)
({A},+)
({B},−)
({A,B,C},?)
In (Args,)−, the AA outcome of N is+ (non-default), with a unique (lean) explanation
T − : [P : ( /0,−)] — [O : ({A},+)]. Likewise, In (Args,)+, the AA outcome is −, with
a unique (lean) explanation T + : [P :( /0,+)] — [O :({B,},−)]. Thus, no matter what the
default outcome is, the burden of establishing as well as explaining the AA outcome is
on the proponent’s side.
In what follows, we formalize this feature of AA-CBR in terms of proof standards.
In our setting, following [20], a proof standard can be seen as a function taking a
statement and an AA framework and returning an element of {TRUE, FALSE}. Then, a
statement s is satisﬁed by a proof standard STD in (Args,) iff STD(s,(Args,)) =
TRUE. In the context of AA-CBR, the following statement is of interest:
sd : “given a case base CB and a default outcome d, the outcome of the new case N is
d”.
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We identify a proof standard that meets this statement:
Deﬁnition 11. The Scintilla of Evidence proof standard SE is deﬁned as follows:
SE(sd ,(Args,)) = TRUE iff there exists an admissible dispute tree T for ( /0,d).
Intuitively, the SE proof standard amounts to the proponent P having a good line of
defence (a tree of arguments and attacks) in a dialectical exchange of arguments for and
against the default outcome. [7,18,20], to name a few, give proof standards with the same
name. Our variant is in the same spirit in that a statement by a proponent P meets the
standard “if it is supported by at least one defensible P argument”, where, in our variant,
we interpret support as as a dispute tree, and defensible as admissible.
Directly from Theorem 3, we get that AA outcome meets the SE proof standard, in
that accepting the default case equates with the satisfaction of the SE proof standard:
Theorem 11. ( /0,d) ∈G iff SE(sd ,(Args,)) = TRUE.
This result also indicates that no matter what the default outcome d is, the burden of
proof to establish that the AA outcome of the new case N is d falls upon the proponent, in
that the proponent needs to construct an admissible dispute tree that dialectically justiﬁes
the outcome. This is witnessed in examples we considered, particularly Example 10.
6. Related and Future Work
Argumentation has perhaps been most prominently applied to legal CBR. For example,
[6] use AA frameworks to reason with particular types of animal cases by representing
legal natural language arguments involved in cases as formal arguments, at the same time
taking into account preference information over values promoted by arguments. [1] show
how to represent the well known legal CBR systems HYPO [4], CATO [2] and IBP [8] in
Abstract Dialectical Frameworks [7]. Another strand of research concerns argumentation
schemes—patterns to create and/or classify arguments in order to decide how precedent
cases determine the new case (e.g. [20,21,27]). There, proof standards can be employed
to evaluate arguments based on argumentation schemes, as in e.g. [20].
In contrast, we are not focused on legal CBR, but rather on general CBR, as
overviewed in [28]. In that setting, our work stands out in its aim to provide explanations
as to why a particular outcome was obtained in solving CBR problems. To this end we
exploit the dialectical aspect that AA supplies by way of dispute trees. Explaining AA
outcome can be seen through a dialogical exchange of arguments (namely, past cases)
between a proponent in favour of the default outcome, and an opponent against the de-
fault outcome. Explanations in AA-CBR relate to the notion of burden of proof from
legal CBR, see e.g. [18,26]. However, legal CBR exhibits characteristics not necessarily
applicable to CBR in general, or at least not to the type of problems we consider. For
instance, in legal CBR, there is usually more granularity to factors [22]; certain hypo-
thetical reasoning and/or background knowledge is involved [3]. Whether and how our
approach can be applied to, for instance, legal CBR, is a line of future work: it would
be interesting to look at other proof standards as well as burdens of production and per-
suasion [18]; relating AA-CBR to argumentation based on the discovery of association
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rules, as in e.g. [31], and to argument and theory construction from legal cases, as in
e.g. [10], would be interesting too.
In terms of general CBR, determining why an outcome is computed is deemed cru-
cial, but is inherently hard to deﬁne formally [30]. A common form of explanation in
CBR amounts to displaying the most similar past cases. In particular, transparency, in
not trying to “hide conﬂicting evidence” [30, p. 134], is identiﬁed as desirable. This is
fulﬁlled in AA-CBR, as the grounded extension contains all past cases nearest to the new
case, be they of agreeing or diverging outcomes (cf. Proposition 2). However, merely dis-
playing the nearest cases (especially with contrasting outcomes) is not always sufﬁcient
to explain the proposed outcome. To address this issue, k-nearest neighbour approaches
produce only the most similar among the nearest neighbours. But then, “the transparency
goal is no longer fulﬁlled [. . . ] if k > 1” [30, p. 136]. In contrast, (lean) explanations in
AA-CBR amount to (relevant) dispute trees, where not only the nearest cases, but also
cases relevant to the AA outcome play a role.
In our setting, relevance of past cases is deﬁned via their commonalities with the
new case, in terms of factors shared. By contrast, [24] proposed supporting/opposition
criteria based on counting the ratio (or probability) of how often a factor appears in a
case with the outcome d/d. We provide explanations without quantifying the appearance
of factors, but we plan to investigate such a possibility in the future.
Several works deﬁne methods for determining explanations for the (non-)acceptabili-
ty of arguments in argumentation, see e.g. [16,17,19,29]. These works use trees as the
underlying mechanism for computing explanations, but not in a CBR setting. Study of
formal relationships with these works is left for future work. Other work in argumen-
tation, e.g. [9], investigates the usefulness of explanation in argumentation with users.
Similar explorations for our approach are also left for the future.
Last but not least, computational complexity is an important aspect of explana-
tions in CBR. The construction of the grounded extension G of a given (Args,) is
P-complete [15], so we conjecture that extracting explanations from G results in a low
construction overhead [30], as follows: if f is the (ﬁxed) number |F| of factors, letting
n to be the number |Args| of arguments, to construct a (maximal or admissible) dispute
tree for ( /0,d) we need to traverse the constructed graph of G from ( /0,d) in depth at most
f , in every layer exploring at most n f arguments, so the process is polynomial in n with
O(n f
2
). Precise analysis of this conjecture, as well as the complexity of construction of
AA frameworks corresponding to case bases, is left for future work.
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